Abstract. The group signature scheme [1], ACJT for short, is popular. In this paper we show that it is not secure. It does not satisfy exculpability. The group manager can sign on behalf of any group member. The drawback found in the scheme shows that some inductions are not sound, though they are prevalent in some so-called security proofs.
Introduction
Group signatures, introduced by Chaum and Heyst [2] , allow individual members to make signatures on behalf of the group. Generally, a group signature must satisfy the following properties [1] :
Unforgeability: Only group members are able to sign messages on behalf of the group. Anonymity: Given a valid signature of some message, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard for everyone but the group manager. Unlinkability: Deciding whether two different valid signatures were produced by the same group member is computationally hard. Traceability: The group manager is always able to open a valid signature and identify the actual signer. Coalition-resistance: A colluding subset of group members (even if comprised of the entire group) cannot generate a valid signature that the group manager cannot link to one of the colluding group members. Exculpability: Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign on behalf of other group member.
Group signatures can be used to constitute a very useful primitive in many settings. It has become a hot problem to research group signatures in recent [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] .
At Crypto'2000, Ateniese et al. [1] proposed a group signature scheme. The authors claimed that the scheme was practical and provably secure coalitionresistant. Recently, we find it is false. The group manager can sign on behalf of any group member. That is to say, the popular group signature scheme does not satisfy exculpability. It's the first time to show that the signature scheme is not secure. The attack developed in the paper is novel and interesting. The drawback found in the popular signature scheme shows that some inductions are not sound, though they are prevalent in so-called security proofs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews ACJT group signature scheme. An attack is presented in Section 3. Some conclusion remarks are given in Section 4.
Review
Let > 1, k, p be security parameters and let λ 1 , λ 2 , γ 1 , γ 2 denote the lengths satisfying
Define the integral ranges
k . The initial phase involves the group manager (GM) setting the group public key Y and his secret key S.
SETUP:
1. Select random secret p -bit primes p , q such that p = 2p + 1 and q = 2q + 1 are primes. Set the modulus n = pq. 2. Choose random elements a, a 0 , g, h ∈ R QR(n) (of order p q ). 3. Choose a random secret element x ∈ R Z * p q and set y = g x mod n. 4. The group public key is : Y = (n, a, a 0 , y, g, h).
The corresponding secret key (known only to GM) is: S = (p , q , x).
Suppose now that a new user wants to join the group. We assume that communication between the user and the group manager is secure. The selection of per-user parameters is done as follows:
hr mod n to GM and proves him knowledge of the representation of C 1 w.r.t. bases g and h.
2. GM checks that C 1 ∈ QR(n). If this is the case, GM selects α i and
) and sends GM the value C 2 = a xi mod n. The user also proves to GM: (a) that the discrete log of C 2 w.r.t. base a lies in Λ, and 
The statements (i-iii) prove that the user's membership secret x i = log a C 2 is correctly computed from C 1 , α i , and β i .)
4. GM checks that C 2 ∈ QR(n). If this is the case and all the above proofs were correct, GM selects a random prime e i ∈ R Γ and computes 
(2 p+k) and compute: 
Accept the signature if and only if c = c and
In case of a dispute, GM executes the following procedure:
OPEN: 1. Check the signature's validity via the VERIFY procedure. 2. Recover A i (and thus the identity of P i ) as
Prove that log g y = log T2 (T 1 /A i mod n).
Remark 1:
In the original description [1] , we observe that
It's not difficult to find it should be corrected to keep the consistency between r 3 and s 3 .
Analysis
In this section, we show that ACJT group signature scheme doesn't satisfy exculpability. More precisely, we find the group manager (GM) can sign on behalf of any member if GM replaces Step 2 in the original SETUP phase with following:
Then GM records (a xi , A i , e i ) in the JOIN phase (pointing to the member P i ). Note that no member can prevent GM from setting a = a t 0 (mod n).
Using (t, a
xi , A i , e i ) and the secret key (p , q ), GM can sign on behalf of the member P i . Given a message m, GM proceeds as follows:
1. Choose ω ∈ R {0, 1} 2 p and compute: (2 p+k) and compute
3. Choose X ∈ R Λ and compute
and λ 2 > 4 p , it's easy to find ρ 1 , ρ 2 , ρ 3 ∈ Z satisfying the above restrictions.) 5. Compute
Correctness: For convenience, denote by ξ i the inverse of e i modulo φ(n), i.e., e i ξ i = 1 mod φ(n)
Hence, we have
Thus c = c. It's easy to check that
Clearly, we also have
Therefore, the scheme is not exculpable. Remark 2: The authors [1] claimed that First note that due to Corollary 2, GM does not get any information about a user's secret x i apart from a xi . Thus, the value x i is computationally hidden from GM. Next note that T 1 , T 2 , and T 3 are an unconditionally binding commitments to A i and e i . One can show that, if the factorization of n would be publicly known, the interactive proof underlying the group signature scheme is a proof of knowledge of the discrete log of A ei i /a 0 (provided that p is larger than twice to output length of the hash function / size of the challenges). Hence, not even the group manager can sign on behalf of P i because computing discrete logarithms is assumed to be infeasible.
But by the above attack, GM is not forced to know a user's secret x i even that T 1 , T 2 , and T 3 are an unconditionally binding commitments to A i and e i . We should stress that the likes of the above induction are not sound, though they are prevalent in some so-called security proofs.
Conclusion
In this paper we show that ACJT group signature scheme is insecure. The attack introduced in the paper will be helpful for researching group signature schemes in the future. Incidently, the fair E-cash system [8] directly based on ACJT fails. But it seems that the attack does not apply to the extensions of ACJT proposed in [9] . The extension proposed in [10] appears to resist the attack at the cost of the presence of a trusted third party.
